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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
BLUE V. PRINCE GEORGE'S CNTY.: THE SUPERVISORY 
EMPLOYEE EXCEPTION TO THE HANDGUN LAW IS 
LIMITED TO THE ENCLOSED PREMISES OF THE 
BUSINESS IN WHICH THE EMPLOYEE WORKS. 
By: Brittaney Fabiano 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the supervisory employee 
exception to the handgun law does not include an open parking lot adjacent 
to a business establishment. Blue v. Prince George's Cnty., 434 Md. 681, 76 
A.3d 1129 (2013). Legislative history and the statutory language made it 
apparent that the exception was not intended to extend beyond the "enclosed 
premises in which the employee works." ld. at 698, 76 A.3d at 1138-39. 
On the night of June 17,2008, while working as head of security at a strip 
club in Capitol Heights, Maryland, Roguell Blue ("Blue") confronted two 
individuals in the parking lot adjacent to the club whom he believed were 
engaged in "illicit sexual activity." One of the individuals ran when Blue 
ordered them out of the car. After the man fled, Blue called the police to 
report the incident, but the police were already en route in response to 
alleged gunshots. When the police arrived, they noticed Blue was carrying a 
handgun and asked to see his permit. Blue produced a laminated copy of the 
supervisory employee exception and informed the officers that he was 
required to carry a handgun to ensure the safety of the club, which included 
the adjacent parking lot. Nevertheless, he was arrested and charged with 
carrying a handgun without a permit in public, a violation of MD. CODE 
ANN., CRIM. LAW § 4-203(a)(1). The State entered a nolle prosequi, 
disposing of the charges against Blue. 
On September 14, 2009, Blue filed a complaint against Prince George's 
County and three police officers in the Circuit Court for Prince George's 
County alleging false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and 
a violation of MD. CON ST. art. 24. During trial, Blue argued he was a 
supervisory employee under MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 4-203(b)(7) 
("Section 4-203(b )(7)"); therefore, the officers did not have probable cause 
to arrest him. At the end of the trial, the court granted the defendants' 
motion for judgment on the malicious prosecution claim and sent the 
remaining claims to the jury. The jury entered a judgment in favor of Blue. 
Both Blue and the county appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland. The intermediate appellate court upheld the trial court's dismissal 
of the malicious prosecution claim and reversed the judgment granted by the 
jury. The court stated the police had probable cause to arrest Blue because 
he was not "within the confines of the business establishment" in which he 
was employed. The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted Blue's petition 
for writ of certiorari to determine if Section 4-203(b)(7) extends to a parking 
lot adjacent to a nightclub. 
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The Court of Appeals of Maryland began by noting that the case turned 
on the legislative intent behind the phrase "within the confines of the 
business establishment" in Section 4-203(b)(7). Blue, 434 Md. at 689, 76 
A.3d at 1133. To determine the legislative intent of the phrase, the court 
stated it must examine the plain meaning of the statutory text, the legislative 
history of the statute, and the consequences of any alternative readings of the 
text. Id. 
The phrase "within the confines of the business establishment" is not 
defined within the statute. Blue, 434 Md. at 690, 76 A.3d at 1134. Turning 
to common dictionary definitions for guidance, the court determined the 
plain meaning of the terms "within," "confines," "business," and 
"establishment" placed emphasis on an interior space as opposed to an entire 
area. Id. at 690-91, 76 A.3d at 1134. The court read the phrase at issue 
narrowly to mean "the interior space of a commercial enterprise, where one 
may find its furnishings and staff, enclosed by walls or similar bounds." Id. 
The legislative history of Section 4-203(b)(7) provided the court with 
further guidance to determine the General Assembly's intent. Blue, 434 Md. 
at 692, 76 A.3d at 1135. The State first attempted to regulate the possession 
of handguns in 1886 by prohibiting any individual who was not a 
"conservator of the peace" from wearing or carrying a handgun. Id. Eight 
years later, the General Assembly amended the provision to include an 
exception for individuals carrying a weapon as a reasonable means of self-
defense. Id. at 692-93, 76 A.3d at 1135. In 1972, after a significant rise in 
deaths and injuries caused by handguns, emergency legislation requiring a 
permit to carry a handgun was proposed as an attempt to reduce the number 
of handguns on the streets. Id. at 693, 76 A.3d at 1135. 
The newly proposed legislation contained an exception allowing property 
owners and lessors to carry a handgun without a permit "within the confines 
of any dwelling, business establishment, or real estate owned or leased." 
Blue, 434 Md. at 693, 76 A.3d at 1135 (quoting S.B. 205 (Md. 1972), § 3; 
H.B. 277 (Md. 1972), § 3). Some legislators, however, found the initial 
exception pertaining solely to owners and lessors was insufficient to properly 
protect a residence or place of business. Blue, 434 Md. at 694, 76 A.3d at 
1135-36. Ultimately, owners' and lessors' rights to carry handguns without a 
permit on their property were extended to allow supervisory employees to 
carry a handgun without a permit as well. Id. at 695, 76 A.3d at 1136. The 
rights of a supervisory employee to carry a handgun were limited specifically 
to "the confines of the business establishment." Id. The court previously 
had confirmed that this exception was to provide a means of self-defense in 
one's home or place of business; the purpose was not to provide for 
transportation of the weapon. Id. at 695-96, 76 A.3d at 1137 (citing 
Montgomery Cnty. v. Atl. Guns, Inc., 302 Md. 540, 545, 489 A.2d 1114 
(1985)). 
Blue argued that the court's interpretation of Section 4-203(b)(7) defied 
"logic and common sense," requiring him to drop his handgun at the door 
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before investigating any disturbances in the parking lot and potentially 
allowing disruptive persons to flee or cause him harm. Blue, 434 Md. at 696, 
76 A.3d at 1137. The court rejected this argument, stating that this is exactly 
the limitation intended under Section 4-203(b )(7). Id. The supervisory 
employee exception in the handgun law was not intended to allow private 
citizens without valid permits to act as law enforcement officers. Id. at 697, 
76 A.3d at 1137-38. After examining the legislative history, the court 
determined that the purpose of Section 4-203(b)(7) was for a supervisory 
employee to defend himself, other employees, and patrons inside the 
business establishment. Id. at 697, 76 A.3d at 1138. Once a person engaging 
in illicit activities has fled the establishment, there is no longer a need to 
protect the establishment. Id. 
The dissent asserted that the majority's interpretation of the statutory 
language was too narrow. Blue, 434 Md. at 699, 76 A.3d at 1139 (Greene, J., 
dissenting). After examining the legislative intent, the dissent concluded that 
the majority erroneously dismissed Blue's more logical interpretation. Id. at 
704, 76 A.3d at 1142 (Greene, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that "[h]ad 
the legislature intended for a supervisory employee's right to carry a 
handgun to stop at the entryway of a building, it would have and could have 
said so." Id. at 703-04, 76 A.3d at 1141-42 (Greene, J., dissenting). 
In Blue, the Court of Appeals of Maryland narrowly interpreted Section 4-
203(b)(7) to limit the supervisory employee exception to the interior space of 
the building in which an employee works. This ruling reinforces the 
legislature's attempt to control the widespread possession of handguns by 
necessitating that individuals maintain a permit in order to carry a handgun 
on the streets. As a result, individuals under the supervisory employee 
exception should note that a permit is still required to carry a handgun in an 
area beyond the four walls of the business establishment. 
